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JUDICIAL POWER-THE INHERENT POWER OF THE COURTS To COMPEL
FUNDING FOR THEm OwN NEEDS-In re juvenile Director, 87 Wn. 2d
232, 552 P.2d 163 (1976).
In 1975, the superior court of Lincoln County, Washington, pro-
posed that the salary of its director of juvenile services be raised by
$125 per month.' The Lincoln County Board of Commissioners re-
jected the increase and refused to honor the subsequent order to pay
it. At the show cause hearing before the Lincoln County superior
court, the trial judge2 held that because the superior court had au-
thority to appoint the director, it also had the inherent power to agree
with him on compensation. Consequently, R.C.W. § 13.04.040, grant-
ing to the board the power to determine the director's salary, was
held to be an unconstitutional infringement on the court's power to
appoint.3
On appeal by the board of county commissioners, the Washington
Supreme Court did not agree that the statute was unconstitutional. 4
1. When the position was created in 1973, the director's salary was established by
mutual agreement between Lincoln County, its superior court, and the director him-
self. The salary was paid by the county, which was then reimbursed by the state. Regu-
lar salary increases thereafter were tied to salary increases for state employees, but
the proposed increase which precipitated this dispute was above the state scale and
would have been paid entirely by the county. Brief for Respondent at 3-4, In re
Juvenile Director, 87 Wn. 2d 232, 233-34, 552 P.2d 163, 164 (1976).
2. The judge was called in from a neighboring county, apparently to avoid con-
flict of interest problems. Id. at 233, 522 P.2d at 164.
3. The supreme court found that the trial court's decision hinged on two basic
conclusions. The trial court held first that R.C.W. § 13.04.040, granting power to the
board of county commissioners to set salaries, was an infringement on the superior
court's inherent power to compel funding of its own functions. In re Juvenile Direc-
tor, 87 Wn. 2d 232, 235, 552 P.2d 163, 165 (1976). R.C.W. § 13.04.040 provides in
pertinent part: 'The probation counselors and persons appointed to have charge of
detention facilities shall each receive compensation which shall be fixed by the board
of county commissioners ...." WASH. Rav. CODE § 13.04.040 (1976). The trial court
also held that such granting of power violated the doctrine of separation of powers.
87 Wn. 2d at 237, 552 P.2d at 166. Article IV, § 1, of the Washington Constitution,
defining judicial power, states: "The judicial power of the state shall be vested in a su-
preme court, superior courts, justices of the peace, and such inferior courts as the
legislature may provide." On the facts of the case, the supreme court expressly rejected
the first conclusion, see note 4 and accompanying text infra, and also the second, but
left the door open for a future finding, given stronger evidence, that action by the
board pursuant to the statute could be an unconstitutional infringement on judicial
power. For a brief discussion of the doctrine of separation of powers, see note 18 and
accompanying text infra.
4. In re Juvenile Director, 87 Wn. 2d 232, 236, 552 P.2d 163, 166 (1976). The
superior court, citing Norman v. Van Elsberg, 262 Or. 286, 497 P.2d 204 (1972), held
that the burden of proof rested with the board of county commissioners to prove that
the director's salary was unreasonable. But in that case, the statute in question allowed
the court to designate the salary of the official in question and the board to approve it.
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The court, however, did agree unanimously with the general proposi-
tion that, under certain circumstances, the judiciary is empowered to
set salaries of court personnel under the doctrine of inherent powers.
Five of the eight members of the court who participated in the
decision 5 declared that this power should be used only when the
court could show by "clear, cogent, and convincing proof ' 6 that the
salary increase was reasonably necessary. Because that standard had
not been met by the Lincoln County superior court, the decision was
reversed. 7
In re Juvenile Director8 defines the scope of the inherent power of
the judiciary to compel funding of its own operations. 9 It imposes, for
the first time in any state jurisdiction, a strict standard which the court
must meet to prove the reasonable necessity10 of such action-clear,
cogent, and convincing proof.11 This note will analyze the court's rea-
The Washington statute, R.C.W. § 13.04.040, quoted in part at note 3 supra, gives
the board of county commissioners full authority to fix salaries. Because the statute in
question differed significantly from the one at issue in Norman, that case was not
persuasive.
5. Justice Dolliver, who had only recently been appointed to the court, did not
participate in the decision. In re Juvenile Director, 87 Wn. 2d 232, 233, 552 P.2d 163,
163 (1976).
6. Id. at 251, 552 P.2d at 174.
7. Id. at 252, 552 P.2d at 175. A concurring opinion disagreed with the majority
view on the issue of standard of proof, favoring the less stringent "preponderance of
the evidence" test to prove reasonable necessity. Id. at 253, 552 P.2d at 175. Justice
Brachtenbach signed both the opinion which contains the actual holding and the con-
curring opinion. His position on the proper standard of proof remains unclear.
8. 87 Wn. 2d 232, 552 P.2d 163 (1976).
9. The Washington Supreme Court introduced the proposition that the judicial
branch has inherent power to compel funding in Zylstra v. Piva, 85 Wn. 2d 743, 539
P.2d 823 (1975) (courts do not relinquish inherent powers when their employees are
allowed to bargain collectively, nor does a statute authorizing collective bargaining
impair the inherent power of the judiciary to require payment of necessary funds for
the efficient administration of justice). Other recent Washington Supreme Court deci-
sions dealing with the doctrine of inherent powers in general include State v. Fields,
85 Wn. 2d 126, 530 P.2d 284 (1975) (courts have inherent power to prescribe rules
of procedure); State v. Smith, 84 Wn. 2d 498, 527 P.2d 674 (1974) (courts have
inherent power to set conditions of bail), State v. Cook, 84 Wn. 2d 342, 525 P.2d 761
(1974) (courts have inherent power to determine who may appear before them as
legal counsel); Iverson v. Marine Bancorp., 83 Wn. 2d 163, 517 P.2d 197 (1973)
(courts have inherent power to make and waive rules); Deskins v. Waldt, 81 Wn. 2d
1, 499 P.2d 206 (1972) (inherent power of courts to punish for contempt cannot be
legislatively modified).
10. Reasonable necessity is shown to exist when, absent the requested funding, the
court could not fulfill its duties or would be unable to efficiently administer justice. 87
Wn. 2d at 252, 552 P.2d at 175. Cf. note 36 infra (use of equivalent terms in other
jurisdictions). See generally Kaplan, There Must Be No Interference With The Courts,
MUNICIPAL COURT REV., April 1966, at 15 (funding is reasonably necessary when it
is essential to court survival or efficient functioning as a judicial agency).
11. 87 Wn. 2d at 251, 552 P.2d at 174. Although many jurisdictions require proof
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sons for establishing this high standard of proof, examine the standard
itself, and compare it with the standards applied in other jurisdictions
to compel judicial funding under the doctrine of inherent powers. In
addition, this note will compare the application of the doctrine in
other jurisdictions with the scope of the doctrine as now applicable in
Washington. Comparison will focus primarily on those states in which
the doctrine has been liberally construed to permit broad judicial dis-
cretion in its application. Finally, the values which support liberal
application of the doctrine-the desire for judicial independence and
adequate financing-and those which militate against liberal use of
the doctrine-constitutional barriers and policy restraints-will be
examined. 12
This note concludes that by requiring courts to meet a strict stan-
dard of proving reasonable necessity before they are allowed to
compel funding of their own operations under the inherent powers
doctrine, the Washington Supreme Court has correctly perceived the
pitfalls and illusory attractiveness of liberal application of the doctrine
and has correctly determined that constitutional and political consid-
erations require great restraint in its application. Although some
beyond a reasonable doubt in certain types of civil actions, see, e.g., 27 U. FLA. L.
REV. 260 (1974), the Washington courts do not equate clear, cogent, and convincing
proof with proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Bland v. Mentor, 63 Wn. 2d 150, 154,
385 P.2d 727, 730 (1963). Rather, it is a standard of proof lying somewhere between
a preponderance of the evidence and the more rigorous standard of proof more com-
monly found in criminal proceedings. See 9 J. WIGMORE, EViDENCE § 2498, at 329(3d ed. 1940); James, Burdens of Proof, 47 VA. L. REv. 51 (1961). Nevertheless,
the standard is high, particularly when compared with that used in most other juris-
dictions in which the doctrine of inherent powers has recently been used to compel
funding of court expenses. See, e.g., Smith v. Miller, 153 Colo. 35, 384 P.2d 738(1963); Carlson v. State ex rel. Stodola, 247 Ind. 631, 220 N.E.2d 532 (1966);
Judges for the Third Judicial Circuit v. County of Wayne, 383 Mich. 10, 172 N.W.2d
436 (1969), modified on rehearing, 386 Mich. 1, 190 N.W.2d 228 (1971); Norman
v. Van Elsberg, 262 Or. 286, 497 P.2d 204 (1972); Commonwealth ex rel. Carroll
v. Tate, 442 Pa. 45, 274 A.2d 193, cert. denied, 402 U.S. 974 (1971). Implicit in
these decisions is the requirement that the normal preponderance of the evidence
standard of proof in civil cases is adequate to meet the court's burden of proving
reasonable necessity, both when the burden lies with the courts to prove legislative
unreasonableness and when it lies with the legislative body to prove judicial unreason-
ableness.
12. An ancillary problem in the case, beyond the scope of this note, is whether
R.C.W. § 13.04.040 is constitutional. The Lincoln County superior court declared
it to be unconstitutional on the grounds mentioned at note 3 supra. The Washington
Supreme Court upheld that court's reasoning with respect to the inherent powers
doctrine, but limited the scope of its applicability by imposing a strict standard of
proof. Thus the statute is constitutional, but if it operates to deny the power to fund
when a court proves reasonable necessity by clear, cogent, and convincing proof,
then it is unconstitutional as applied because it infringes upon the court's inherent
power.
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commentators and courts have seen great promise in the doctrine, par-
ticularly as a solution to budgetary problems in the judicial branch,
doctrinal and practical limitations preclude its extensive application.
I. THE COURT'S REASONING
After rejecting the statutory basis for the superior court's decision, 13
Justice Utter examined the constitutional basis upon which a court
may justifiably compel funding to meet its own requirements. He
found that because the judiciary has no power to appropriate funds,
as does the legislative branch,14 and because it has no power to exer-
cise a veto as a bargaining device, as does the executive, 15 its only
means of participating in the budgeting process is through litigation to
compel funding.16 The doctrine of inherent powers provides the theo-
retical justification for such lawsuits. 17
Justice Utter analyzed at some length the doctrines of separation of
13. 87 Wn. 2d at 236, 552 P.2d at 166. See discussion at notes 3 & 4 supra.
14. 87 Wn. 2d at 237, 552 P.2d at 166. That the power to tax is a legislative
power is almost axiomatic. WASH. CONST. art. II, § 1 does not specifically list the
power to levy taxes as a legislative power, but WASH. CONST. art. VII, § 1 (dealing
with revenue and taxation) makes it clear that this is the case. Accord, Love v. King
County, 181 Wash. 462, 44 P.2d 175 (1935) (taxation is a legislative process). See
generally R. DISHMAN, STATE CONSTITUTIONS: THE SHAPE OF THE DOCUMENT (Nation-
al Municipal League State Constitutional Studies Project No. I, rev. ed. 1968). That
the power to tax is a legislative power is consistent with conventional constitutional
theory as well, as reflected in THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (A. Hamilton): "The legis-
lature . . . commands the purse . . . .The judiciary, on the contrary, has no influ-
ence over ... the purse; no direction . . . of the wealth of the society; and can take
no active resolution whatever."
15. 87 Wn. 2d at 237, 552 P.2d at 166. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7.
16. 87 Wn. 2d at 237, 552 P.2d at 166.
17. Under the doctrine of inherent powers, a branch of government possesses the
means necessary to perform its constitutionally assigned tasks even though the pow-
ers to do so are not specifically granted either by the Constitution or by enabling legis-
lation. The doctrine of inherent powers is thus a necessary adjunct of the doctrine of
separation of powers. See note 18 infra. Each branch has separate duties assigned it
by the Constitution and each branch is said to have, of necessity, those powers which
will enable it to carry out its duties. Those powers are inherent in the branch. Knox
County Council v. State ex rel. McCormick, 217 Ind. 493, 498, 29 N.E.2d 405, 407-
08 (1940). The doctrine of inherent powers is most often invoked by the courts to
protect their ability to perform their constitutionally assigned duties. It has been ap-
plied to punish for contempt, Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375 (1962); to allow courts
to appoint counsel for a criminal defendant, Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 73
(1932); and to appoint counsel for indigent defendants, State v. Rush, 46 N.J. 399,
217 A.2d 441, 448 (1966) (the county should pay counsel "at 60% of the fee a cli-
ent of ordinary means would pay an attorney of modest financial success"). But see
United States v. Dillon, 346 F.2d 633 (9th Cir. 1965) (requiring an attorney to rep-
resent an indigent defendant is not a "taking" of the attorney's services which would
require compensation under the fifth amendment). It has been used to control photog-
raphy in court, Ex parte Sturm, 152 Md. 114, 136 A. 312 (1927); to honor letters
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powers and checks and balances18 which provide the doctrinal under-
pinnings of inherent powers. He argued that a delicate balance exists
among the three branches of government, fostered by the fact that
each has separate powers and functions while exercising some inflii-
ence over the others. Serious imbalance can occur, however, if checks
by one branch on the activities of another serve to undermine the op-
rogatory, Ex parte Taylor, 110 Tex. 331, 220 S.W. 74 (1920); and to insure a fair
criminal trial, Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
18. This note assumes, as did the Washington Supreme Court, that the doctrines
are applicable in the state as well as the federal context. Although the focus of this
note is the doctrine of inherent powers, a brief discussion of the related doctrines of
separation of powers and checks and balances is in order.
The doctrine of separation of powers is based on the philosophical assumption that
governmental power should be limited and that the only way to limit it is to divide it
among coequal branches of government. In its purely theoretical form, the doctrine
has three elements. First, the agencies of government should be divided into three
categories: The legislature, executive, and judiciary. Second, the functions of govern-
ment are, by nature, divisible into three classes: The legislative, executive, and judicial.
The difference between the first and second elements is as follows: The agencies of
government are divided to create, almost artificially, three separate centers of power
within government. The functions, on the other hand, are viewed as natural tasks
which all governments must perform regardless of their structure. The third element
is "separation of persons"--that is, not allowing the same people to occupy the same
positions or perform the same functions. M. VILE, CONSTrUTIONALISM AND THE SEPARA-
TION OF POWERS 14-18 (1967). In its pure form the doctrine of separation of powers
represents a system of negative checks on the exercise of power by the government,
designed to protect the citizens against abuse of power.
Applied practically, the doctrine is not absolute, however, and is complemented in
constitutional theory by the doctrine of checks and balances. Indeed, there is evidence
that the drafters of the constitution viewed checks and balances as an integral part of
the separation of powers doctrine. Madison, in discussing separation of powers, argued:
"[U] nless these departments [the three branches of government) be so far connected
and blended as to give to each a constitutional control over the others, the degree of
separation which the maxim requires, as essential to a free government, can never in
practice be duly maintained." THE FEDERALIST No. 48 (J. Madison). Nevertheless,
the doctrine of checks and balances is distinct and useful as a positive check by one
branch on abuse of power by another. Thus, the executive branch checks the legisla-
tive through its limited veto power, U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 7, and, for example, by set-
ting tariff policies, see, e.g., Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944); Exec. Or-
der No. 11,615, 3 C.F.R. 602 (1971-1975 Compilation) (superseded by Exec. Order
No. 11,718, 3 C.F.R. 877 (1971-1975 Compilation), reprinted in 12 U.S.C. § 1904
app., at 764 (Supp. V 1975)). The same branch exercises limited judicial power by
granting pardons and appointing judges, U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. Likewise, the legis-
lative branch has limited control over both the executive and judicial branches through
its impeachment power, id. art I, § 2, cI. 5; art. II, § 4. Finally, the judicial branch
performs legislative functions when, for example, it sets general rules for automobile
safety, see Baltimore & O.R.R. v. Goodman, 275 U.S. 66 (1927), limited by Pokora
v. Wabash Ry., 292 U.S. 98 (1934), or exclusionary rules in criminal procedure, see,
e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
The court injunction is an effective and frequently used check on executive power.
This jurisdictional overlap was both intended and necessary. Without it, the strict re-
quirements of separation of powers alone would have created inflexible iiqstitutions
incapable of dealing with the gray areas where functions, in fact, overlap. For a more
extensive discussion of separation of powers and checks and balances, see Juvenile
Director, 87 Wn. 2d at 238-43, 552 P.2d at 167-71 (collecting cases and citing au-
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erations of that branch or otherwise interfere with its lawful responsi-
bilities. 19 He found that the potential for this kind of abuse exists in
the area of judicial financing. 20 When, for example, the refusal of a
legislative body to allocate funds results in the inability of the court to
fulfill a necessary and lawful function, the court may compel that
expenditure through the exercise of its inherent power. In this man-
ner, the court can act as a check on an abuse of power by the legisla-
tive body which threatens the balance between the branches. 21
Justice Utter noted, however, that the judicial branch itself is not
immune from abusing its power. Judicial involvement in court fi-
nancing creates a risk of abuse because a lawsuit to compel court
funding based on the doctrine of inherent powers ignores the fact that
monetary allocation is essentially a political act. Constitutionally and
traditionally it is performed by persons, elected by the people and re-
sponsible to them, whose decisions are based on compromise and the
weighing of competing interests. Thus it is necessary to balance judi-
cial autonomy with reciprocity and a recognition of non-judicial inter-
ests when considering the exercise of inherent judicial power to
compel court funding. Because the public is the final arbiter of dis-
putes between the branches, it is necessary that the public find accept-
able the exercise of this inherent power if it is to have any long term
usefulness. 22 Justice Utter concluded that the courts do, in fact, have
thority). See generally A. VANDERBILT, THE DOCTRINE OF THE SEPARATION OF POWERS
AND ITS PRESENT-DAY SIGNIFICANCE (1953); THE FEDERALIST Nos. 47-51 (J. Madison);
Frohnmayer, The Separation of Powers: An Essay on the Vitality of a Constitutional
Idea, 52 ORE. L. REV. 211 (1973). For a criticism of the doctrine in the context of
the development of administrative law, see J. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS
1-2, 49 (1938).
19. 87 Wn. 2d at 243, 552 P.2d at 170.
20. Justice Utter stated:
Although the judiciary possesses authority to check the arbitrary or unconstitu-
tional exercise of power by legislative and executive branches, it is the only
branch excluded from participation in the formulation and adoption of the gov-
ernment budget. Such exclusion makes the courts vulnerable to improper checks
in the form of reward or retaliation.
87 Wn. 2d at 244, 552 P.2d at 170. See also C. BAAR, SEPARATE BUT SUBSERVIENT:
COURT BUDGETING IN THE AMERICAN STATES (1975); E. FRIESEN, E. GALLAS, & N.
GALLAS, MANAGING THE COURTS 67-82 (1971); G. HAZARD, M. MCNAMARA, & I. SAN-
TILLES, COURT FINANCE AND UNITARY BUDGETING (A.B.A. Comm'n on Standards of
Judicial Admin., 1973) [hereinafter cited as COURT FINANCE AND UNITARY BUDGET-
ING] ; Carrigan, Inherent Powers and Finance, TRIAL, Nov.-Dec. 1971 at 22.
21. 87 Wn. 2d at 245-47, 552 P.2d at 170-72.
22. Id. at 250-51, 552 P.2d at 173-74. Public acceptance was argued to be im-
portant for two reasons. First, through its electoral power, the public can discour-
age use ofjudicial power against public interest. Second, and according to Justice Utter
more important, compelling a legislative body to allocate funds against its wishes is a
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the inherent power to compel funding for their own use, but that in
order to protect these legitimate competing interests, the exercise of
that power should be carefully controlled. For this reason, the ma-
jority imposed a strict standard of proof, requiring the courts to prove
the reasonable necessity of any expenditure by clear, cogent, and con-
vincing evidence. The opinion concludes by suggesting that this strict
standard may not be appropriate in all circumstances, and that where
the ability of a court to perform a "constitutionally-mandated func-
tion" is at issue, a different standard might apply.23
II. THE USE AND ABUSE OF THE INHERENT POWERS
DOCTRINE
A. Inherent Powers
The doctrine of inherent powers has long been used in ways related
form of coercion which, in the long run, would undermine public support upon which
the rule of law ultimately rests. See P. FITZGERALD, SALMOND ON JURISPRUDENCE 89
(12th ed. 1966).
23. 87 Wn. 2d at 252, 552 P.2d at 175. No guidance is given in the opinion as
to when a less burdensome standard would apply. However, the following parameters
may be implied: First, the term "constitutionally-mandated function" should be rela-
tively narrowly defined to include those functions of the courts which are either ex-
pressly ordered by the Constitution or which flow naturally and directly from it, in-
cluding, for example, the payment of attorney's fees to provide a proper defense for
indigent criminal defendants, see, e.g., Luke v. County of Los Angeles, 269 Cal. App.
2d 209, 74 Cal. Rptr. 771 (1969); State v. Rush, 46 NJ. 399, 217 A.2d 441 (1966),
and the payment of necessary expenses which are unanticipated but of constitutional
importance, see, e.g., People v. Randolph, 35 Ill. 2d 244, 219 N.E.2d 337 (1966)
(trial court of a sparsely populated county ordered the state to pay for an unantici-
pated and costly murder trial), or which come upon a court because of the actions of
a higher court. For example, if the work load of a court were substantially increased
due to a proliferation of writs of habeas corpus as a result of the United States Su-
preme Court's decision in Swain v. Pressley, 97 S. Ct. 1224 (1977), that court could
arguably justify a mandate for more funds and not be required to meet the higher
standard of proof to obtain them-this being a "constitutionally-mandated function"
as therein defined by the Supreme Court. There is a great qualitative as well as factual
difference between the suit in which a court applies the inherent powers doctrine and
flowing rhetoric to acquire control of the courthouse elevator, see Board of
Comm'rs v. Stout, 136 Ind. 53, 35 N.E. 683 (1893), or to purchase new chairs and
carpet, see State ex rel. Kitzmeyer v. Davis, 26 Nev. 373, 68 P. 689 (1902), and the
suit in which a person's freedom is in jeopardy. In the former cases, the link between
need and constitutional necessity is tenuous at best, whereas in the latter the link is
direct and immediate. Consistent with the holding in Juvenile Director, the standard
of proof to which a court is held is correspondingly higher in the former suits than
in the latter. Likewise, the need to take into account the public interest in insuring
that notorious criminals be tried and convicted must give way to the mandate of the
Constitution that such persons be guaranteed a fair trial. Whether the public approves
of the expenditure of money for that purpose is irrelevant; thus a high standard of
proof is unnecessary. See generally notes 57-60 and accompanying text infra.
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to court financing, 24 but only relatively recently has the scope of its
application been broadened to permit courts more direct control over
funds not specifically allocated to the judicial branch. Traditionally,
all governmental budgeting, including judicial budgets, had been con-
sidered the prerogative of the legislative branch because it has the
power to tax25 and is closer to the roots of sovereign power-the
people. Consequently, a strict interpretation of the separation of
powers doctrine has led some courts to refrain from compelling legis-
lative bodies to pay for unbudgeted expenses except in unusual or ex-
treme circumstances. 26 Some jurisdictions continue to follow this
narrow application of the doctrine, 27 while others have denied the va-
lidity of the doctrine, at least to the extent that it can be used to justify
compulsion of present budgeting for future expenditures. 28
More recently, however, scholarly advocates have declared the in-
herent powers doctrine to be a useful, almost invaluable tool enabling
courts to execute their responsibilities properly and to solve the broad
24. The doctrine has been used in a variety of ways related to court financing, in-
cluding determining the necessity for and selection of court employees, fixing salaries
and requiring their payment, setting effective dates of salary raises, determining an-
nual leave and retirement benefits, compelling services to third parties (meals for ju-
rors, elevators for court visitors, etc.), and mandatory funding for courthouse facili-
ties, equipment, and supplies. See cases cited in J. CARRIGAN, INHERENT POWERS OF THE
COURTS 13-21 (National College of the State Judiciary, 1973); text accompanying
note 53 infra.
25. See note 14 supra.
26. An early and much cited case in which the potential of the doctrine was rec-
ognized but its application was narrowly restricted was State ex rel. Hillis v. Sulli-
van, 48 Mont. 320, 137 P. 392 (1913). The Montana Supreme Court stated that, giv-
en the existence of a statutory scheme which would normally be expected to allow
proper court financing, the exercise of inherent power to compel unbudgeted spending
was allowed only when those statutory methods of meeting the specific problem failed,
or when there was some other emergency.
27. See, e.g., Merrill v. Phelps, 52 Ariz. 514, 84 P.2d 74 (1938) (only when a
statute is so unreasonable that it hampers or prevents a court's performance of its
constitutional duties is there an unconstitutional infringement on the court's inherent
power); State v. Leavitt, 44 Idaho 739, 260 P. 164 (1927) (the courts' inherent pow-
er to appoint is applicable only when there is some peculiar emergency, or when the
agency with statutory appointment power either neglects or refuses to act); Board of
County Comm'rs v. Devine, 72 Nev. 57, 294 P.2d 366 (1956) (courts have inherent
power to secure employees at public expense only if the regular statutory scheme
fails or if the appointing body arbitrarily and capriciously fails to provide such a per-
son and efficient administration ofjustice is thereby destroyed or seriously impaired).
28. See, e.g., Morgan County Comm'n v. Powell, 292 Ala. 300, 293 So. 2d 830
(1974) (authority to determine budgetary allocations vests completely in the legisla-
ture; courts may use inherent powers to compel funding only when an emergency ex-
pense has already been incurred). Cf. O'Coin's, Inc. v. Treasurer of County of Wor-
cester, 362 Mass. 507, 287 N.E.2d 608 (1972) (courts may incur reasonably necessary
expenses by using the inherent powers doctrine, but only with prior approval of the
chief justice of the state's supreme judicial court or some other designated judicial of-
ficer).
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and chronic problems of judicial financing.2 9 Also, decisions by the
supreme courts of Michigan, 30 Colorado,3 ' Oregon, 32 Indiana,33 and
Pennsylvania 34 lend support to the view that courts can and should
take a more active role in budget matters by bringing suit to enforce
their inherent powers. The rationale for this form of judicial activism
29. Carrigan, supra note 20; Note, Judicial Financial Autonomy and Inherent
Power, 57 CORNELL L. REv. 975 (1972).
30. Judges for the Third Judicial Circuit v. County of Wayne, 383 Mich. 10, 172
N.W.2d 436 (1969), modified on rehearing, 386 Mich. 1, 190 N.W.2d 228 (1971).
An action by the judges of the third judicial district seeking to compel the county and
its officers to pay for additional court officers and employees was sustained by the
Michigan Supreme Court. The court held that inherent powers may be invoked in an
emergency to compel hiring of additional administrative help. In dictum the court
noted that because the courts must exercise this power carefully as a coequal branch,
they bear the burden of proving reasonableness. The facts of the case reveal, how-
ever, that the reasonableness of the demand was not disputed; Wayne County de-
fended solely on the basis of lack of funds. 172 N.W.2d at 446. The holding of the
Michigan Supreme Court was that non-availability of funds was not relevant, and the
final order resulted in an increase of approximately $200,000 in the court's yearly
budget. 190 N.W.2d at 241-42; 172 N.W.2d at 446. The fact that the expenditures
were prospective in nature rather than retroactive, as well as the amounts involved
and the rhetoric the court used in justifying the decision, distinguish this case from
the line of cases cited in notes 26-28 supra.
31. Smith v. Miller, 153 Colo. 35, 384 P.2d 738 (1963). In an action to compel
a board of county commissioners to approve salaries of court employees set by the
court (a procedure provided for by statute), the Colorado Supreme Court held that
district courts have inherent power to fix salaries of their employees and the boards of
county commissioners have a ministerial duty to approve them, absent a showing that
the salaries are unreasonable and unjustified or that the court's actions are arbitrary
and capricious.
32. Norman v. Van Elsberg, 262 Or. 286, 497 P.2d 204(1972). See note 4 supra.
33. Carlson v. State ex rel. Stodola, 247 Ind. 631, 220 N.E.2d 532 (1966). The
Indiana Supreme Court sustained a city court's power to mandate approval of its
budget proposal by the city council. Even statutes which set certain salary schedules
for court employees had to yield to the inherent right of the court to determine its
own needs and compel the legislative body to meet them. "[T] he ... court [has]
authority to provide for the payment of expenses necessary for its proper functioning
in the absence of any showing of abuse of such discretion." Id. at 536. See Noble
County Council v. State ex rel. Fifer, 234 Ind. 172, 125 N.E.2d 709 (1955).
34. Commonwealth ex rel. Carroll v. Tate, 442 Pa. 45, 274 A.2d 193, cert. denied,
402 U.S. 974 (1971). From an original prayer for $3,962,532 from the Court of
Common Pleas of Philadelphia, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court entered judgment
for $1,365,555. 274 A.2d at 200. The court held that, although the court seeking the
funding bore the burden of proving reasonable necessity for such expenditures, a
judicial finding of reasonableness would supersede a prior legislative determination that
funding was unnecessary. Id. at 199-200. The amounts involved, coupled with the
language found in the opinion, suggest very strongly that the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court considered the doctrine of inherent powers to be the means whereby the judicial
branch may achieve full fiscal autonomy and thus true indelendence from the other
branches of government:
[T] he Judiciary must possess the inherent power to determine and compel pay-
ment of those sums of money which are reasonable and necessary to carry out
its mandated responsibilities, and its powers and duties to administer Justice, if
it is to be in reality a co-equal, independent Branch of our Government.
Id. at 197 (emphasis in original). The decision occasioned much comment, both posi-
tive, see Carrigan, supra note 20; Note,-Judicial Finincial Autonomy and Inherent Pow-
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is concern over inadequate legislative consideration for judicial needs
and the resulting widely held perception that the judicial branch is the
weakest of the three "coequal" branches of government.35
All of these decisions require as a condition precedent to the partic-
ular expenditure a finding of "reasonable necessity" or some similar
condition.36 Some of these courts place the burden of proving lack of
reasonable necessity on the legislative body resisting the expendi-
ture,37 while others place the burden upon the courts to prove reason-
able necessity. 38 None of these decisions, however, sets out a clear
standard of proof by which this condition precedent must be shown.
In this respect, In re Juvenile Director presents a new formula for the
application of the doctrine.
The substantive attraction of using the inherent powers doctrine
more widely to compel court funding lies not so much in the desire to
increase judicial power, but rather in the promise it offers for solving
the much broader and more chronic problems of judicial financing. 39
er, 57 CORNELL L. REV. 975 (1972), and negative, see Comment, State Court Asser-
tion of Power to Determine and Demand Its Own Budget, 120 U. PA. L. REV. 1187
(1972). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court may have softened its inherent powers
rhetoric somewhat in Glancey v. Casey, 447 Pa. 77, 288 A.2d 812 (1972), in which
it held it was powerless to overturn a legislative determination that judicial salary in-
creases were retroactive only to a limited extent-a determination which the lower
court had disputed, citing Tate and the inherent powers doctrine as authority. The
high court distinguished Tate because in that case judicial salaries were not involved.
This distinction is more technical than explanatory because the funds in Tate did
involve salaries of court employees, though not of judges.
35. See note 20 and accompanying text supra.
36. Other jurisdictions use roughly equivalent terms in stating the test applied to
determine whether an inherent powers mandate will be used to compel expenditures.
See, e.g., Smith v. Miller, 153 Colo. 35, 384 P.2d 738, 741 (1963) (county commis-
sioners must show salaries fixed were "unreasonable and unjustified" in order to carry
the burden of proof to defeat a mandate); Judges for the Third Judicial Circuit v.
County of Wayne, 383 Mich. 10, 172 N.W.2d 436, 441 (1969) ("practical necessity"),
modified on rehearing on other grounds, 386 Mich. 1, 190 N.W.2d 228 (1971).
37. This is so in Colorado, Oregon, and Indiana. See notes 4 & 31-33 supra. In
Colorado and Oregon, the courts relied in part on statutes controlling the determina-
tion of judicial salaries.
38. Although both the Michigan and Pennsylvania supreme courts place the burden
of proving reasonable necessity upon the courts, the ease with which that burden is
met appears to differ. See notes 30 & 34 supra.
39. Indeed, at least one successful practitioner has suggested that the doctrine of
inherent powers is potent enough to solve the problems courts face because of in-
creased caseloads, shortage of personnel, inadequate equipment, and shortage of
funds for other purposes. He states:
[T] he separation of powers doctrine, properly understood, imposes on the judicial
branch . . . a positive responsibility to perform its own job efficiently. This posi-
tive aspect of separation of powers imposes on courts affirmative obligations to
assert and fully exercise their powers, to operate efficiently by modern standards,
to protect their independent status, and to fend off legislative or executive at-
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Given the long history of inadequate funding and frequent and well-
reasoned calls for reform of court financing,40 the doctrine of inherent
powers offers an enticing means of self-help, enabling the courts to
resolve budgetary problems and to function smoothly. In fact, the doc-
trine is a useful tool for asserting judicial independence and for ac-
complishing objectives of limited financial import and scope.4 1 With
the exception, however, of the Pennsylvania, Michigan, and possibly
Colorado decisions, the history of the doctrine does not lead one to
the irresistable conclusion that it is a panacea for solving the financial
ills of the judiciary.4
B. Inherent Powers in Juvenile Director
In contrast to the affirmative use of the doctrine, expressed or im-
plied in the cases and articles cited earlier, in ways that would allow
broad control by courts over their own funding, the Washington Su-
preme Court in Juvenile Director has declared that inherent powers
will be used only as a defensive tool in court financing problems. By
requiring a court seeking to utilize the doctrine to compel expenditure
of funds to meet a very high standard of proof,43 it has served notice
to both the legislature and the public that the courts' inherent power
to compel funding will be used only in circumstances in which failure
tempts to encroach upon judicial prerogatives. From that responsibility arises an
inherent power of courts to require that they be reasonably financed.
Carrigan, supra note 20, at 22 (emphasis in original). Mr. Carrigan was counsel for
the successful respondent in Smith v. Miller, 153 Colo. 35, 384 P.2d 738 (1963),
discussed at note 31 supra, and is now a member of the Colorado Supreme Court.
40. See, e.g., COURT FINANCE AND UNITARY BUDGETING, supra note 20; Brennan,
Judicial Fiscal Independence, 23 U. FLA. L. REV. 277 (1971); National Conference
of Court Administrators & Conference of Chief Justices, Statement of Principles-The
Need for Independence in Judicial Administration, 50 JUDICATURE 129 (1966); Rieke,
Unification, Funding, Discipline and Administration: Cornerstones for a New Judicial
Article, 48 WASH. L. REV. 811, 818-24 (1973).
41. See note 24 supra; cases cited at note 53 infra.
42. Indeed, the inability of the courts to enforce their decisions in two of the
three cases places one of the problems in stark relief. The controversy decided in
Judges for the Third Judicial Circuit v. County of Wayne, 383 Mich. 10, 172 N.W.2d
436 (1969), was remanded and, upon rehearing before the Michigan Supreme Court,
the court's inherent power to compel funding was "strengthened" so that reasonable-
ness did not depend on availability of funds in the county to pay for the proposed ex-
penses. 386 Mich. 1, 190 N.W.2d 228, 241-42 (1971). The county, however, ignored
the order. See C. BAAR, supra note 20, at 147. Similarly, in Commonwealth ex rel.
Carroll v. Tate, 442 Pa. 45, 274, A.2d 193, cert. denied, 402 U.S. 974 (1971), the
Philadelphia court of common pleas won a judgment in excess of $1.3 million but
has yet to see any of it. See In re Juvenile Director, 87 Wn. 2d at 251 n.6, 552 P.2d
at 174 n.6.
43. See note 11 supra.
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to exercise that power would threaten the ability of a court to operate
effectively and independently. 44 Such caution is preferable to the
more ambitious approach noted in other jurisdictions and is more
consistent with constitutional and political imperatives.
1. Constitutional limits on inherent powers
a. The taxing power
Power in the courts to determine not only how their funds are spent
but also the amount they have to spend is precluded simply because
the legislature, not the courts, has the power to levy taxes and thus to
determine the amount of funds available for all governmental pur-
poses.45 A court order directing legislative funding of a judicially
proposed budget approaches the constitutional limits determined by
balancing the often competing doctrines of separation of powers and
checks and balances. 46 As the extent to which the courts attempt to
control their own budgets increases, the likelihood of violating the leg-
islature's right to speak for the people as to the allocation of tax re-
sources increases as well. 47 The point at which judicial self-determi-
nation exceeds its proper bounds cannot be precisely defined, but the
threat to the judiciary of legislative retaliation and of erosion of public
support increases as it is approached. The cautious view taken by the
court in Juvenile Director shows a healthy respect for these possibili-
ties and will enable the Washington courts to define the reasonable
limits of their inherent powers while avoiding the problems which
would accompany what might appear to be hasty overreaching.
b. Separation of powers
The doctrine of separation of powers48 does not require that the
44. See notes 52-60 and accompanying text infra.
45. See note 14 and accompanying text supra. Direct taxation by the courts has
never been proposed and is not a reasonable alternative.
46. "Checks and balances is the notion that while a different branch performs
each of.. . three functions, the others should, by the performance of their functions,
prevent arbitrary or unlimited exercise of any one power." C. BAAR, supra note 20,
at 151; see In re Juvenile Director, 87 Wn. 2d at 240-243, 552 P.2d at 168-70; note
17 supra. See generally W.B. GWYN, THE MEANING OF THE SEPARATION OF POWERS
(1965); M. VILE, supra note 18.
47. See generally COURT FINANCE AND UNITARY BUDGETING, supra note 20.
48. See note 18 supra.
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three branches of government be absolutely separate, but rather al-
lows for a certain amount of overlap in function and authority.49 In-
deed, such overlap is vital because extending the inherent powers doc-
trine to allow a court full control of its own budgetary allocations is
contrary to the constitutional premise of the doctrine-no branch of
government can be trusted to determine the extent of its own pow-
ers.50 Should this occur, there would no longer be a separation, or even
a reasonable overlapping of powers, but a severe encroachment by the
judiciary into the affairs of the legislative branch. A direct confronta-
tion between constitutionally equal state governmental branches has
been avoided thus far because most decisions have involved a state
supreme court sustaining a lower court's use of inherent power to
compel relatively minor expenditures of either a municipal or county
legislative body.51 Consequently, the limits of the doctrine of inherent
powers have not been tested. The limitations imposed upon the exer-
cise of the doctrine by the court in Juvenile Director will insure that
these constitutional principles are not violated. This means, however,
that the doctrine is not as useful as some have claimed in seeking to
resolve basic problems in judicial financing.
2. Policy considerations
The use of the inherent powers doctrine in Washington, if applied
with the discretion evidenced in Juvenile Director, will enable courts
to achieve a variety of modest but necessary results. Typical charac-
teristics of inherent powers lawsuits in other jurisdictions52 are
meeting direct threats to the judicial process by external forces, man-
dating relatively modest emergency expenditures, legitimately sharing
control with either the executive or legislative branches, and retaining
49. Id.; see J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES§ 539 (Boston 1833).
50. This was a basic principle upon which Charles de Montesquieu formulated
his treatise on liberty. See C. DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF LAWS 69 (4th ed. Lon-
don 1878) (1st ed. Geneva 1748). The link between Montesquieu and our own con-
stitutional heritage of separation of powers is most evident in THE FEDERALIST No. 47
(J. Madison).
51. COURT FINANCE AND UNITARY BUDGETING, supra note 20, at 3-4. The few cases
in which coequal branches at the state level were in conflict involved very narrow
and relatively minor issues. See, e.g., In re Appointment of Clerk of Court of Ap-
peals, 297 S.W.2d 764 (Ky. 1957) (power to appoint new clerk of court upon in-
cumbent's death); State ex rel. Schneider v. Cunningham, 39 Mont. 165, 101 P. 962
(1909).
52. See note 24 supra.
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a particular judicial prerogative which has gained the force of law
because of custom or longstanding practice.53 Thus the doctrine has
been most successful as a defensive tool. In addition to constitutional
dangers, aggressive use of the inherent powers rationale would cause
serious policy consequences, including limitations on judicial inde-
pendence, a weakening of public trust, and serious budgetary prob-
lems.
a. Judicial independence
One of the primary attractions of the use of the inherent powers
doctrine is increased judicial autonomy. 54 It is not improbable, how-
ever, that excessive use of the doctrine could have the opposite effect
-control over the judiciary because of the increased demand for ac-
countability that would result. In a state such as Washington, where
judges are elected rather than appointed, pressure from the public
during pre-election campaigning could lead to commitments to make
fiscal cuts. 55 Demands and criticism from the legislature could also be
expected. Thus, although the courts could theoretically achieve fiscal
autonomy by using their inherent powers to control their own
budgets,5 6 the resulting political controls might serve to impose other
restrictions on judicial independence which would outweigh the fiscal
gains.
b. Public opinion and trust in the judiciary
Although no attempt has yet been made to determine the nature or
53. See, e.g., Adams v. Rubinow, 157 Conn. 150, 251 A.2d 49 (1968) (legislative
branch has only limited power regarding certain rules of practice, procedure, and
court administration, at least for constitutionally created courts); O'Coin's, Inc. v.
Treasurer of County of Worcester, 362 Mass. 507, 287 N.E.2d 608 (1972) (court
had power under emergency conditions to order payment of $86 for recorder and
tapes necessary for trial); Leahey v. Farrell, 362 Pa. 52, 66 A.2d 577 (1949) (judici-
ary must comply with legislative fiscal decisions unless the legislature acts arbitrarily
or capriciously to deny court funds); In re Surcharge of County Comm'rs, 12 Pa.
D. & C. 471 (C.P. Lackawanna 1928) (common pleas judge should have a stenog-
rapher because every other common pleas judge had been provided with one). See
generally cases cited in J. CARRIGAN, supra note 24, at 13-21.
54. See note 39 and accompanying text supra.
55. See Comment, State Court Assertion of Power to Determine and Demand Its
Own Budget, 120 U. PA. L. REV. 1187, 1203 (1972). These conclusions are nowhere
documented because so far the judicial branch has been largely removed from the
budgetary process.
56. If the rhetoric found in many of the decisions were any indication of status,
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extent of the impact that extensive use of inherent power to compel
court funding would have on public opinion and support for the judi-
ciary,57 it seems reasonable to expect that the impact would be nega-
tive. First, the courts might become convenient scapegoats for a legis-
lature seeking to explain ever-increasing governmental expenditures.
Also, the spectacle of one branch of government insisting that its
budgetary needs be given priority over those of other branches would
be difficult to justify. In the long run, successful assertion of the judi-
ciary's right to compel its own budget would simply raise to a new
level of abstraction the debate over the division of limited resources
available for all governmental purposes. Each branch conceivably
could justify its own needs in terms of what it thought was reasonable
and necessary 58 to insure its proper functioning and independence
from other branches. When all three branches make the same argu-
ments and each is, in theory, coequal, none can really win. Further-
more,. the power and moral force of the judicial branch, resting in
large measure on public acceptance of courts as fair and impartial tri-
bunals, would be seriously eroded. It would be difficult indeed to con-
sider a court as an impartial forum when that same court had a stake
in the outcome of a suit. In the extreme situation, in which a court
demand is met by legislative or executive refusal to comply,59 the judi-
cial branch would have little to gain and a great deal of respect to
lose.60
c. Budgeting
The foregoing discussion leads to the conclusion that the doctrine
of inherent powers is too. circumscribed by constitutional and political
restraints to be of significant value in solving the basic problems
which courts face because of inadequate funds. At present, the courts
in Washington are funded from a variety of sources, including state
one might conclude that several courts had already reached this level of independence.
See, e.g., Board of Comm'rs v. Stout, 136 Ind. 53, 35 N.E. 683 (1893); State ex rel.
Kitzmeyer v. Davis, 26 Nev. 373, 68 P. 689 (1902); Commonwealth ex rel. Carroll
v. Tate, 442 Pa. 45, 274 A.2d 193, cert. denied, 402 U.S. 974 (1971).
57. See generally C. BAAR, supra note 20, at 148.
58. See note 36 and accompanying text supra.
59. See note 42 supra.
60. This recalls President Jackson's well-known response to the Supreme Court
decision in Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832): "'John Marshall has *made




legislative allocations, 61 county and city appropriations, 62 and court
fees assessed. 63 Such decentralized judicial funding has been widely
and justifiably criticized. 64 In general, the most favored solution to the
problems of court financing is a system of centralized funding - uni-
tary budgeting-whereby all state courts (with the possible exception
of justices of the peace and some municipal courts) would be financed
from state funds appropriated by the legislature.6 5 Assuming that the
present decentralized system of court funding is inadequate and that
some form of unitary budgeting is desirable, the question arises, what
effect would the use of inherent powers have on achieving that objec-
tive? Two contradictory effects are reasonably predictable.
61. The salaries of the judges of the supreme court and one-half of the salaries of
the superior court judges are paid by legislative appropriation. WASH. CONST. art. IV,
§ 13. The salaries of the judges of the court of appeals are paid entirely from state
funds. WASH. CONST. art. IV, § 30; WASH. REV. CODE § 2.06.060 (1976).
62. Counties are required to pay one-half the salaries of superior court judges,
WASH. CONST. art. IV, § 13, as well as employee salaries and other costs of operating
and maintaining superior and district courts. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 2.28.139, .140
(1976); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 2.32.210, .360, .370 (1976). Municipal courts are sup-
ported by municipal appropriations. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE §§ 34.46.090, .130,
.140 (1976).
63. In some cases, the costs of court operations are borne by the court itself, with
income derived from the fees it collects and retains for its internal expenses. See Rieke,
supra note 40, at 821 n.51. Though this practice is not as prevalent as it once was,
pressure on courts to contribute more to the county budget through increased fees
has almost the same result. See Seattle District Court, King County Washington, A
Management Audit by the Office of County Auditor (May 12, 1972).
64. See generally C. BAAR, supra note 20; E. FRIESEN, E. GALLAS, & N. GALLAS,
supra note 20; COURT FINANCE AND UNITY BUDGETING, supra note 20; Rieke, supra
note 40. Specific criticisms include the very real possibility that the members of the
board of county commissioners, who allocate the funds to support the superior and
district courts, may be parties in a dispute before the same courts, thus presenting
possible conflicts of interest; the lack of funds available in some counties to ade-
quately finance their courts; the fact that most county funds come from property
taxes-a regressive and limited source of income which may not meet rising budgetary
needs of either the courts or other county governmental bodies; the obvious conflict-
of-interest problems where the fee justice system still exists; and the general disorgani-
zation and unevenness of the present funding system.
65. A "most significant need is to provide adequate appropriated funds for the op-
eration of the entire judicial system from state rather than local government sources."
Citizens' Committee on Washington Courts, 1972 Conference Summary, point 5, at 3.
See COURT FINANCE AND UNITARY BUDGETING, supra note 20, at 8-13. See generally
C. BAAR, supra note 20; Rieke, supra note 40. The advantages of unitary budgeting
would include (1) a strengthening of the judicial branch in relation to executive and
legislative branches at all levels of state and local government, (2) a more equitable
distribution of funds because surpluses and deficits could be equalized from county to
county, (3) increased ability for unified planning and development of more efficient
administrative processes, and presumably, (4) increased awareness by the legislature
of the needs of the judiciary because of greater exposure to its problems at all levels
and the resulting increase in budget allocations.
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The first was observed in Colorado following that state's supreme
court decision in Smith v. Miller.66 Prior to 1970, Colorado courts
were financed primarily from county and local funds, with some sala-
ries and benefits paid by the state. Following the 1963 Smith decision,
in which it was held that the courts had the inherent power to set em-
ployees' salaries, 67 the counties found their court expenses increasing
by ten to twenty percent with little practical means of controlling such
increases.68 The counties thereafter supported unitary judicial bud-
geting at the state level,69 apparently reasoning that state control of
court expenses was preferable to no control. In 1970, unitary bud-
geting was instituted in Colorado.70 In Washington, this result is less
likely under the conditions created by Juvenile Director, because the
standards which would allow a court to compel a particular expendi-
ture are at present so strict that they do not pose as significant a threat
to municipal and county control over their respective courts. Only if
the frequency of the successful use of inherent power were to increase,
or if the applicable standards were modified, 7' could one expect the
doctrine to have the same impact on Washington court budgeting as it
had in Colorado.
A second possible effect of the doctrine would be just the opposite
of the first. The use of inherent power to compel court funding could
act as an inducement to the state legislature to avoid centralizing state
financing of the court system. Admittedly, there is no demonstrable
precedent for this result; however, the legislature might prefer to re-
tain a fragmented system of court financing. Under the present decen-
tralized system, demands for payments under the inherent powers doc-
trine would involve relatively modest amounts, would come from
individual courts, and would be directed against city and county legis-
66. 153 Colo. 35, 384 P.2d 738 (1963).
67. 384P.2dat741.
68. ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, STATE-LoCAL RELA-
TIONS IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 207-09 (1971). The situation was also ag-
gravated by a 68% increase in the number of district judges two years after the Smith
decision. Id. at 208.
69. See C. BAAR, supra note 20, at 144.
70. ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, STATE-LOCAL RELA-
TIONS IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 207 (1971).
71. Modification of the standard would be undesirable but not an unlikely event
considering the fact that the more rigid standard of proof may not in fact enjoy the
support of a majority of the court. See note 7 supra. Should the question be raised




lative bodies.7 2 If unitary budgeting were adopted, demands for pay-
ment would be directed to the state legislature, would often involve
larger amounts because of the larger budget base of the state judiciary,
and would come from the "judicial branch" of government. The state
legislature may prefer the de facto limitations of the present decen-
tralized system to the unknown dangers of unitary budgeting. Al-
though it is unlikely that such considerations alone would be sufficient
to deter the creation of a system of centralized funding, and although
the limitations of Juvenile Director pose no major threat to legislative
control over expenditures, such factors should be considered as the
use of the inherent powers doctrine to compel court funding develops.
III. CONCLUSION
Juvenile Director shows a thoughtful awareness of the conflicts that
exist between the need for judicial independence and the demand for
more adequate fiscal support for the court system on the one hand,
and the perils of confrontation with the legislative branch and the
public on the other. By purposefully establishing a high standard of
proof when the inherent powers doctrine is to be applied in circum-
stances not involving constitutionally mandated functions, the court is
serving notice that the doctrine is applicable in situations in which the
need for such judicial intervention in the budgeting process is truly
justified. Because the decision will discourage extensive use of the
doctrine, it allows the courts to have modest influence on their own
budgets without threatening the legislative branch's basic position as
the budgeting authority. Were the high standard of proof to be modi-
fied so that courts would find it easier to compel funding, it would
increase the likelihood of conflict without appreciably enhancing the
usefulness of the doctrine.
John C. Taggart
72. This has been the past experience with the doctrine in most jurisdictions. See
note 51 and accompanying text supra.
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